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“You Have to Confess”: Rape and the Politics of 
Storytelling
Tara Roeder, St. John’s University
Abstract: This article examines the discourse of rape in contemporary culture, paying special attention 
to the courtroom setting, where rape victims are often required to tell cohesive, linear narratives that 
underscore their blamelessness if they hope to be believed. Because of deeply entrenched cultural myths 
about rape, the type of story often required for the successful prosecution of perpetrators may require 
rape victims to construct narratives that do not accurately reflect their lived experience. Writers such as 
Susan Brison, Patricia Weaver Francisco, and Alice Sebold engage with the complex politics of rape and 
its telling in their memoirs. While constructing stories that will suffice in the courtroom setting remains an 
important task for many rape victims, such stories may ultimately have to be relinquished and rewritten in 
order to revise prevailing cultural perceptions of rape, its perpetrators, and its victims. The memoirs of rape 
survivors thus come to function as a different—and necessary—type of public testimony. 
Keywords: rape, memoir, storytelling, courtroom rhetoric
Copyright by Tara Roeder
And so, when the time comes, you have to turn to him, 
the maniac’s sperm still greasing your thighs, 
your mind whirling like crazy. You have to confess 
to him, you are guilty of the crime 
of having been forced.
— Adrienne Rich, “Rape”
The relationship between trauma and storytelling is rarely linear. In her groundbreaking work Trauma 
and Recovery, Judith Herman cautions trauma victims and those working with them of the danger of a 
“premature demand for certainty,” cautioning that “zealous conviction can all too easily replace on open, 
inquiring attitude” (1997, 180). Rape victims who choose to make their stories public and/or seek redress 
from the justice system, however, will indeed find themselves under intense pressure to tell clear, concise, 
and coherent accounts of the violence they have undergone. 
The single-minded demands of legal and political power structures may negatively impact trauma 
survivors struggling to have their complex stories heard. In Human Rights and Narrated Lives, Kay 
Schaffer and Sidonie Smith explore both the risks and the possibilities for transformation embodied in 
trauma narratives, tracking the multiple and overlapping purposes served by stories constructed around 
collective traumas such as apartheid in South Africa, the forced sexual slavery of Korean women by the 
Japanese government during World War II, and the unethical treatment of US prisoners. They describe 
their book as a “testimony to the efficacy of stories: stories silenced by and emerging from fear, shame, 
trauma, and repression; stories enlivened by hope, connection, commitment, and affiliation; stories fed 
Roeder: "You Have to Confess"
19Journal of Feminist Scholarship 9 (Fall 2015)
by calls for justice, fueled by empathy and an ethics of equality and human dignity” (Schaffer and Smith 
2004, 223). While they cite such stories and the human rights campaigns that sustain and employ them to 
promote social change as “the most viable hope for extending democracy, social justice, and freedom” (234), 
they also critique the way in which these narratives may be repurposed when put in the service of larger 
human rights campaigns. A significant example of this kind of rhetorical “altering” occurred at the hearings 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, in which many witnesses who testified saw 
their stories acting as a vehicle for social change even as they were flattened to fit into a preexisting schema 
of victim forgiving oppressor. The multiplicity of other, more complex emotions and desires that might 
inspire and become embodied in trauma narratives (e.g., hatred, desire for revenge, despair, confusion) can 
be discouraged in a context in which the search for one cohesive narrative is privileged. 
In this article, I look at rape as both a personal and a collective trauma, one in which the type of linear, 
cohesive narrative privileged by the legal system has particularly harmful effects on both victims of rape and 
culture as a whole. In light of Schaffer and Smith’s argument, philosopher and memoirist Susan Brison’s 
claim that rape survivors may ultimately have to “give [their story] up, in order to retell it, without having 
to ‘get it right,’ without fear of betraying it, to be able to rewrite the past” (2002, 103) is compelling. My 
goal here is to examine some of the ways in which mainstream responses to rape may be shaped by the 
demands of the judicial system in problematic ways, and to explore the power of alternative testimony such 
as memoir to unsettle preconceived notions about sexual violence. I ultimately advocate for more capacious, 
generative modes of responding to narratives of sexual assault, no matter what form these narratives may 
take.
“Did He Have a Gun?”: Rape Discourse in the Public Sphere
The average rape victim “gives her account of the crime 57 times to various officials before the case even 
lands in court” (Goldman 2008). These accounts will be combed over for inconsistencies by police, lawyers, 
and often, if the stories become publicized, random members of the general public. Evidence that the 
victim’s narrative has been anything less than scrupulously consistent may lead to the outright dismissal of 
her claims. As Andrew E. Taslitz writes in Rape and the Culture of the Courtroom, his critical examination 
of the judicial system and the rhetoric of gender and rape, “With rape, the victim’s truthfulness is almost 
always challenged” (1999, 6). 
Coming forward with a narrative of rape is never easy. The public response to recent cases such as the 
2011 gang rape of an 11-year-old girl by 20 men in Cleveland, Texas attests to a recent resurgence of victim-
blaming in even the most cut-and-dry cases. In this particular instance, for example, numerous reporters 
cited community members who insisted the rape was the fault of the girl, who “dressed older than her age” 
(McKinley 2011). In the court of public opinion, as well as in the actual legal system, the onus is on the rape 
victim to maintain her “innocence” by rigidly adhering to gendered societal scripts about what constitutes 
appropriate appearance and behavior for women who are not “asking” for rape. In the words of Andrea 
Dworkin, when it comes to acts of gendered violence, all too often “the tellers and the stories are ignored 
or ridiculed, threatened back into silence or destroyed, and the experience of female suffering is buried 
in cultural invisibility and contempt” (1983, 20). Women who wish to make their stories of violation and 
abuse public are often met with retraumatizing reactions such as blame and doubt, rather than empathy 
and belief.
On May 14, 2011, Nafissatou Diallo, a member of the housekeeping staff at Manhattan’s Sofitel hotel, 
reported a sexual assault by International Monetary Fund head Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Almost 
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immediately, her account was called into question in print by men such as prominent French philosopher 
Bernard-Henri Lévy and conservative economist Ben Stein, who wrote: “The prosecutors say that Mr. 
Strauss-Kahn ‘forced’ the complainant to have oral and other sex with him. How? Did he have a gun? Did 
he have a knife? … [I]f he was so intimidating, why did she immediately feel un-intimidated enough to alert 
the authorities as to her story?” (Stein 2011). 
Stein’s victim-blaming rhetoric is unfortunately all too common when it comes to the crime of rape. 
Unlike most other crimes (arson, murder, etc.), the assumption that rape victims are somehow complicit in 
their own violation is shockingly standard. In her seminal text Against Our Will, Susan Brownmiller asserts 
that there is “a provable bias by police and juries against the word of the female victim … particularly the 
word of a black female victim” (1975, 175). In the case of Diallo, this doubt was compounded by her position 
as an immigrant, the rumors spread by news outlets like the New York Post (which ran an unsubstantiated 
story calling Diallo a “hooker”), and the fact that her alleged assailant was a powerful man. After reports of 
Diallo’s immigration status and connection with an incarcerated man were released, there was a noticeable 
shift in the way the public received and consumed her story. Rather than being (if it ever was) a rape 
narrative, the alleged attack became a moving target for a variety of competing voices invested in exposing 
“class warfare” or a “broken immigration system” and a warning tale for powerful men about vindictive, 
economically disadvantaged women who will attempt to ruin their careers by crying sexual assault. Although, 
as Herman points out, “in the course of reconstruction, the story [of the survivor of rape] may change as 
missing pieces are recovered” (1997, 180), shifts in Diallo’s chronology of events were often attributed not 
to trauma but to the fact that she must have lied about events. (The fact that Strauss-Kahn’s own story had 
also morphed quite frequently did not seem to matter as much to many mainstream journalists.)
We, the “public,” received Diallo’s account through a myriad of competing prisms, as articles with titles 
such as “Strauss-Kahn’s Accuser: Schemer or Immigrant Survivor?” (Trotta 2011) proliferated. While high-
profile rape cases like this may indeed speak to larger concerns about economic inequality or differences 
in judicial processes, what I found myself longing for amidst the swirl of metaphors and accusations were 
accounts of the irreducible singularity of the victim’s experience. Presented to us through various lenses 
fashioned by competing desires, Diallo is emptied of identity by both detractors and “supporters.” Although 
his intent was different than that of Lévy and Stein, for example, comedian Jon Stewart engaged in a similar 
rhetorical erasure of Diallo’s individuality by referring to her as “an African” in his attempt to link her 
interaction with Strauss-Kahn to the IMF’s economic dealings in Third World countries. Only by putting 
overlapping narratives—the narrative of the victim against the larger backdrop of the climate in which such 
violation occurs—in dialogue with one another can we ever hope to come to an understanding of the complex 
politics surrounding rape and its telling. While there are multiple narratives for public consumption in this 
particular case—attractive stories of power, wealth, and truth-telling, for example—there are also the (non-
metaphorical) narratives told by Diallo herself. The import of fostering widespread societal empathy for 
victims of sexual assault begins with the realization that their stories must be heard within the framework 
of individualized, embodied experience. In the words of Ann Cahill, we need to ask ourselves, “Who are the 
beings being raped?” (2001, 49).
Alternative Testimony: Rape in Memoir 
In her memoir, Lucky, writer Alice Sebold chronicles her own experience as a rape survivor. Violently 
attacked by a stranger while walking across Syracuse University campus one night, she expresses frustration 
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with the reactions of those around her, from her family and neighbors who cannot bring themselves to use 
the word “rape” to the therapist who jokes, “Well, I guess this will make you less inhibited about sex now, 
huh?” (Sebold 2002, 77). From the start, the knowledge that she is expected to perform in “acceptable” 
ways is incumbent on her. When she is encouraged to write about her experience by a poetry professor, her 
violent poem—in which she expresses a desire for revenge ont her rapist—is met with silence and dismay 
by her classmates. “You don’t really feel that way, do you?” asks a male classmate (100). It becomes obvious 
that her narrative deviates in important ways from the scripts of guilt, silence, forgetting, and forgiveness 
often forced upon female victims of sexual violence. 
The form of memoir allows Sebold to shape her story free from the strictures of the legal system, while 
simultaneously offering an insightful critique of the way the system circumscribes the narratives of women 
who have been raped. Sebold’s encounter with police officials after her violent attack underscores the fact 
that rape victims are expected to perform in particular ways if they wish to be believed. She offers a potent 
example of how the truth/lie binary that informs the scrutiny of women’s rape narratives operates in an 
investigative context. Discussing an encounter with the police officer with whom she filed her initial report, 
she writes:  
“Listen,” he said. He began to fumble out an apology. He said he was sorry if he hadn’t seemed very nice 
back in May. “You get a lot of rape cases,” he said. “Most of them never get this far. I’m pulling for you.” … 
Fifteen years later, when doing research for this book, I would find sentences he had written in the original 
paperwork.… “It is this writer’s opinion, after interview of the victim, that this case, as presented by the victim, 
is not completely factual.… it is suggested that this case be referred to the inactive file.” … For Lorenz, virgins 
were not a part of his world. He was skeptical of many of the things I said. Later, when the serology reports 
proved that what I had said was not a lie, that I had been a virgin, and that I was telling the truth, he could not 
respect me enough. (Sebold 2002, 144–45)
Lorenz’s initial response to the evidence of a college student who had just been brutally raped is skepticism. 
It is only when her virginity is “proven” that the officer is free to respect the young woman, who now inhabits 
the realm of “perfect victim.” Sebold’s own narrative tells the story of a woman who convinces those around 
her of the veracity of her experience by molding it to the expectations of both the judicial system and a 
larger social insistence that only “good girls” make sympathetic rape victims.1
Navigating such a hostile system effectively requires knowledge of its tropes. Sebold appears in court 
with the awareness that she “represented an eighteen year old virgin co-ed. I was dressed in red, white, and 
blue” (Sebold 2002, 172). The bodies and comportment of rape victims are scrutinized in often unconscious 
ways by police officers and jurors. In Sebold’s case, she strives to balance the appearance and behavior she 
imagines conform to culturally sanctioned conceptions of femininity and virginity with the kind of certainty 
and assertiveness that tend to mark witnesses as “truthful” in the eyes of those who may not understand the 
ways that traumatic experience can affect normal storytelling habits. 
Feminist scholar Jennifer Griffiths writes that testimony “offers a public enactment of memory, and 
clearly, the cultural context and content work collaboratively to shape testimony” (2009, 5). Sebold’s 
testimony is a virtuoso performance, one that springs from her certitude that any story that veers too far 
away from cultural expectations of coherence and blamelessness will be perceived as suspect:
On television and in the movies, the lawyer often says to to the victim before they take the stand, “Just tell 
the truth.” What it was left up to me to figure out was that if you do that and nothing else, you lose. So I told 
them I was stupid, that I shouldn’t have walked through the park. I said I intended to do something to warn 
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girls at the university about the park. And I was so good, so willing to accept blame, that I hoped to be judged 
innocent by them. (Sebold 2002, 144)
In the powerful words of Adrienne Rich, the rape victim is “guilty of the crime of having been forced” (1973, 
44). To take the stand against one’s rapist is a difficult prospect; in order to be believed, Sebold is compelled 
to parrot victim-blaming rhetoric, and is thus also forced to reinscribe common myths about rape. 
There is also intense pressure to present a cohesive tale where one may not exist: “the story of a case 
must be told in such a way as to satisfy a jury’s need for narrative coherence and fidelity” (Taslitz 1999, 
15). The concept of “truth” in the courtroom setting is problematized for the rape victim because of “the 
intense linguistic trauma wrought by the present system and the immense failure of adversarial ‘truth-
finding’ assumptions in rape cases” (Taslitz 1999, 120). Sebold writes about beginning her testimony: “It 
was a shaky start to the most important story I would ever tell. I began a sentence only to trail off and begin 
again. And this wasn’t because I was unaware exactly what happened in the tunnel. It was saying the words 
out loud, knowing that it was how I said them that could win or lose the case” (Sebold 2002, 174; original 
emphasis). The nature of the legal system puts pressure on witnesses to perform perfectly, especially in the 
face of cross-examination. While the stereotypes that many people hold about rape and its victims already 
put rape victims at a disadvantage during trial, Taslitz points out that “patriarchal stories are not the whole 
problem.… Another barrier stands in the way of a fair rape trial: the adversary system itself. That system 
is based on competition. It assumes that a battle between warring adversaries will yield truth” (9). The 
masculinist notion that truthful stories emerge from combative argument is a further impediment for rape 
victims. In the context of an adversarial courtroom, victims lose control over the shape and presentation 
of their narratives. Sebold echoes this knowledge when she writes about the defense attorney in the case: 
“I reentered the courtroom and took the stand.… In front of me was my enemy. He would do everything 
he could to make me look bad—stupid, confused, hysterical” (180). Indeed, “awe, intimidation, and 
adversariness; reliving rape trauma; and lawyer domination of language are a combination well designed 
to silence victim voices” (Taslitz 1999, 9). Sebold is understandably filled with relief when the court bailiff 
tells her after testifying that she is “the best rape witness I’ve ever seen on the stand” (198). This particular 
narrative performance was marked a “success” in the eyes of the legal system. 
Yet Sebold’s desire, throughout her memoir, to place this story in a larger cultural context is marked. In 
the context of rape culture—signified for Sebold by a crude drawing in the elevator of her sister’s dormitory 
at Penn State of a fraternity gang-rape victim, as well as the later rape of her roommate—Sebold’s story is 
one of many. In the interview published at the end of Lucky, she says that one of her motivations for writing 
the book was “the desire to just put it out there on the table, ‘This is what rape can look like.’ If people maybe 
know more about it, then the victim’s not as alienated” (Sebold 2002, 5). Her particular narrative becomes 
not only a way for her to make sense of her own experience, but also for that experience to be situated in 
a larger framework and serve a larger goal. Memoirs of sexual assault become a different kind of evidence 
than courtroom testimony. They allow victims to regain control of their experience and explore the complex 
truths of rape without altering their narratives to fit seamlessly into culturally sanctioned scripts. In the 
words of Susan Brison, “perhaps there is a psychological imperative, analogous to the legal imperative, to 
keep telling one’s story until it is heard” (2002, 110). Additionally, such texts shed light on the backdrop of 
sexual violence against which women live their lives, serving as invitations to their audiences to begin to 
rethink rape and its effects simply by the act of listening.
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Rape and Re-Vision
Brison’s Aftermath—an account of the violent rape she underwent while on a trip to France—also invites 
readers to grapple with the complexity of engaging with sexual violence, both for the victim and for those 
who hear her story. Like Sebold, Brison acknowledges the widespread pressure to be a “perfect” victim: 
“Since I was assaulted by a stranger, in a ‘safe’ place, and was so visibly injured when I encountered the 
police and medical personnel, I was … spared the insult, suffered by so many rape victims, of not being 
believed or of being said to have asked for the attack” (2002, 7). Yet she also points out that even in her case, 
her assailant claimed she had “provoked” the attack, and the police officer who took her report was quick 
to add the phrase “Comme je suis sportive” (“Since I am athletic”) to explain why she was taking a walk 
on the morning of the rape (7). Simple physical desires such as the urge to exercise must be appropriately 
subsumed into airtight narratives of acceptable female behavior in order to ensure the perceived “innocence” 
of rape victims. Brison’s injured body is further scrutinized by two male doctors: “For about an hour the two 
of them went over me like a piece of meat, calling out measurements of bruises and other assessments of 
damage, as if they were performing an autopsy” (8). Such dehumanizing treatment underscores the ways 
in which the very bodies of rape victims become public property, subject to analysis by those searching for 
evidence of the reality of the violent assault that victims are forced to describe multiple times to multiple 
audiences. Brison’s insistence on being able to revise her own narrative, to “rewrite the past in different 
ways, leading up to an infinite variety of unforeseeable futures” (103), is the impetus behind her project.
The ability to take control of one’s own story is likewise a theme of Patricia Weaver Francisco’s Telling: A 
Memoir of Rape and Recovery, in which Francisco intertwines the story of her own violent rape with fairy 
tales, the work of poets and trauma theorists, and other women’s experiences with rape and with antirape 
activism. Although her own experience with police investigators is largely positive, Francisco also explores 
the ways in which the legal and medical processes connected to rape cannot help but further dehumanize 
victims. She describes her own experience in the hospital after her assault: “A man comes in with a camera, 
explaining that he needs to take photographs of my wounds for evidence. He is perfectly respectful and 
quiet about this, but it requires that he label each cut with a small white card lettered with my name and a 
number. As he props these cards next to my arm, neck, face, hand, and methodically photographs each, I 
feel myself disappearing” (Francisco 1999, 44). Like Brison’s, her body literally becomes evidence as both 
it and her individual experience are subsumed into the larger “justice” system. She writes that “for soldiers 
returning from war, we have medals, monuments, and public ceremonies of memorial. With rape, the 
criminal justice system functions as the formal arena for recognition and restitution, and has largely failed 
at both” (58). Although the man who raped Francisco is never caught, she details her experience watching 
the trial of another serial rapist as a sort of proxy for the trial she never experiences herself. This particular 
trial, in which multiple victims were brutally attacked by a stranger while in their homes, leads to a guilty 
verdict. Yet even when the legal system is successful in prosecuting rapists, Francisco implies, there may be 
other equally meaningful ways for victims to experience closure. 
Like many other women who write about rape, Francisco explores the complex relationship between 
trauma and storytelling: “At first, I could not stop telling the story of the night a stranger raped me. I told 
it obsessively, sequentially, each detail rigidly in place” (1999, 10). While Brison focuses on the feeling of 
“unclenching” that comes after the “obsessive” story is told in a courtroom setting, Francisco also looks 
to the ways in which, absent of that particular context, victims of rape may relinquish the need for such 
rigid storytelling practices. Her own rape has multiple effects—it is ultimately responsible for her divorce, 
as well as her engagement with feminist critique of popular culture (117). Yet the realization that she 
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finds most profound is that telling stories of rape can connect women in activist, as well as therapeutic, 
alliances. Francisco joins a group of feminist activists in Minnesota who design an art project, entitled 
Silent Witnesses, to draw attention to domestic violence. The project consists of  “twenty-six life-size 
wooden figures representing the Minnesota women killed in domestic violence in 1990.… The genius of 
the Witnesses’ design is the fact that they take up space. It’s been said that this is art’s function, ‘to make 
the invisible visible’” (Francisco 1999, 202). By using both their own bodies and the bodies of the women 
represented in the sculpture to purposefully occupy public space, the activists refuse to inhabit the realm 
of invisibility that has been designated for them. The presence of their bodies disrupts the notion that 
violence against women is something that can be repressed or hidden in the “private” sphere. Further, 
by connecting these figures with stories of the murdered women and participating in rallies for domestic 
violence legislation outside the state capital, Francisco and the activists she works with highlight the ways 
in which body, art, and community all play a role in enacting larger social change. 
Such activism may, Francisco suggests, ultimately have an impact on what Brison calls the “widespread 
emotion illiteracy” (Brison 2002, 12) with regard to rape, which compels people Brison is close with to 
either choose not to respond to her rape at all, or to offer clichés such as “what doesn’t kill you makes you 
stronger.” As Brison points out in her introduction, “the prevalent lack of empathy with trauma victims, 
which is reinforced by the cultural repression of memories of violence and victimization … results … not 
merely from ignorance or indifference, but also from an active fear of identifying with those whose terrifying 
fate forces us to acknowledge that we are not in control of our own” (2002, x). This fear may partially 
explain the brutal doubts with which stories of rape are often countered. The unthinkable realization that 
any woman, at any time, might become the victim of a life-changing physical and psychological violation 
merely by virtue of her being is a harder pill to swallow for some than the comforting notion that we can 
protect ourselves by behaving in a certain prescribed way—walking with a “buddy,” wearing less “revealing” 
clothes.2 The idea that we can never be fully in control of our bodies and destiny is a frightening prospect 
that may make many uncomfortable. 
But it is precisely this discomfort we must inhabit if we are ever to make sense of the narratives of 
women who have been raped. Judith Butler’s query in Precarious Lives—“What is real? Whose lives are 
real? … What … is the relation between violence and those lives considered as ‘unreal’?” (Butler 2006, 33)—
is pivotal if we are to meaningfully challenge a paradigm in which the lived experience of many survivors 
is discounted because it does not fit a certain, culturally sanctioned narrative. Only by understanding our 
encounter with the story of any rape victim as an interaction between two subjects can we begin to undo 
the violence of questions such as “What was she wearing?” As Cathy Caruth reminds us, “the problem 
of witnessing trauma … is learning the difficult task of speaking the trauma in the terms offered by the 
survivor” (1996, 117). This is especially true when those terms do not fit our preexisting schemas.
Responding to Rape Narratives
Each of the memoirists I have explored above writes powerfully about the instrumental role that the 
response of listeners plays in the recovery process. The reactions of those who hear rape narratives can 
have the ability to retraumatize victims, or to empower and support them. Judith Herman puts special 
emphasis on the role of witness: “The [rape] survivor needs the help of others who are willing to recognize 
that a traumatic event has occurred, to suspend their preconceived judgments, and simply bear witness to 
her tale” (1997, 68). While Herman focuses primarily on the psychotherapeutic relationship, many of her 
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insights into the narrative and recovery processes following rape are instructive for multiple audiences, 
including the reader who wishes to cultivate an ethical relationship to a narrative born from the violation 
of an embodied subject. Although it would be both irresponsible and philosophically suspect to suggest any 
sort of one-to-one correspondence between reader and therapist, there is nonetheless a way in which the 
knowledges of these distinct but connected positions can inform each other. In contrast to the recurring 
character of the police investigator invoked by Sebold in Lucky, Herman stresses that “the therapist has 
to remember that she is not a fact-finder and that the reconstruction of the trauma story is not a criminal 
investigation. Her role is to be an open-minded, compassionate witness, not a detective” (180). Adopting 
a similar position when we encounter rape narratives in the public sphere functions not only as an act of 
empathy but as a gesture with deep political resonance in a culture where, as I have indicated earlier, the 
blaming and doubt of rape victims have become something of a national pastime. 
Andrea Dworkin writes:
The accounts of rape … and the other commonplaces of female experience that are excavated from the past 
or given by contemporary survivors should leave the heart seared, the mind in anguish, the conscience in 
upheaval. But they do not. No matter how often these stories are told, with whatever clarity or eloquence, 
bitterness or sorrow, they might as well have been whispered in wind or written in sand: they disappear, as if 
they were nothing. (1975, 20)
One only has to read the news to encounter stories of rape on a daily basis, often told from the victim-
doubting position I have critiqued. The prevalence of this position with regard to rape victims easily 
evidences the frustrating truth of Dworkin’s realization: most narratives of rape indeed “disappear,” both 
from the minds of their readers and from culture at large. 
Given the well-documented manifestations of rape culture on many college campuses, I encourage 
my own university students to think critically about mainstream discourse about sexual violence. I often 
share Adrienne Rich’s poem “Rape” (Rich 1973, 44) when we talk about poetry and politics, for example. 
The poem—which puts the reader in the position of a rape victim, “the maniac’s sperm still greasing your 
thighs”—is a powerful testament to the experience of rape victims confronted by a hostile system. The police 
officer in the poem “knows, or thinks he knows, how much you imagined; / he knows, or thinks he knows, 
what you secretly wanted.” The poem ends with the haunting question: “if, in the sickening light of the 
precinct, / your details sound like a portrait of your confessor, / will you swallow, will you deny them, will 
you lie your way home?” 
While many of my female students (and some male students) recognize that the poem is about the 
continued violation of female rape victims in a system that is automatically suspicious of their motives and 
doubtful of their narratives, I am consistently surprised by a small but angry minority of male students 
who are highly resistant to this reading. The first time we read this poem in class, one student (after a 
vibrant discussion in which another student, who had herself been raped, connected the poem to her own 
experience) blurted out, “I wish women would just stop talking about rape already.” Just this past semester, 
a student dismissively commented that the speaker of the poem is “hysterical” and “hates all men.” Another 
very angrily defended the policeman in the poem as “just doing his job.” Even after we then analyzed the 
specific language and imagery Rich uses to describe the policeman, the student maintained his position. 
I actually should not be surprised by these reactions; they merely echo very popular cultural stereotypes 
about rape and its victims, and evidence an anxious desire on behalf of some men to defend their sex 
class against what they perceive as feminist “paranoia” about rape. The “Not all men are rapists!” defense 
is commonly used in response to systematic feminist analysis of patriarchy such as Brownmiller’s or 
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Dworkin’s. As reader-response theorists Patrocinio Schweickart and Elizabeth Flynn remind us, “the 
reader is a producer of meaning; what one reads out of a text is always a function of the prior experiences; 
ideological commitments; interpretive strategies; and cognitive, moral, psychological and political interests 
that one brings to the reading” (Schweickart and Flynn 2004, 2). Hence the wide spectrum of reactions, 
from empathetic recognition to disbelief, to anger, to venomous attack, with which rape narratives are met. 
However, while “it may be true that readers can read in various ways, … are all these ways equally valid, 
valuable, or acceptable?” (Schweickart and Flynn 2004, 3). The answer to this question must be an insistent 
“no” if we truly believe that reading practices have a shaping role in transforming culture. Violent readings 
that purport to judge whether a rape survivor has “lied” relieve the reader of the responsibility to engage 
with the other as a subject bearing witness to her own experience. As Wendy Hesford and Wendy Kozol 
observe,
Personal testimony, understood and judged unproblematically as evidentiary, turns the speaker into a victim 
and molds his or her story into a case history, a piece of positivist evidence.… the reduction of testimony of 
remembered experience to evidence judged either as purely factual or mendacious, obscures the ways in 
which narratives of suffering offer bits of evidence that cannot easily be reduced to evidence.  (Hesford and 
Kozol 2001; quoted in Schaffer and Smith 2004, 37)
Although widely divergent in form and purpose, any account of rape—from literary memoirs to courtroom 
testimony—can be experienced as a “difficult” text, one in which gaps and elisions signify. As Herman 
notes, in “the course of reconstruction, the story [of the survivor of rape] may change as missing pieces 
are recovered. This is particularly true in situations where the patient has experienced significant gaps in 
memory. Thus, both patient and therapist must accept the fact that they do not have complete knowledge, 
and they must learn to live with ambiguity” (1997, 180). The willingness to read from and into a space that 
may constantly revise and rewrite itself is a necessary challenge for those who seek to meaningfully engage 
with accounts of rape. 
Because rape victims risk social marginalization as well as psychic fragmentation, it is important to 
remember that “marginalized individuals … tend more frequently to invoke subversive and subvocal 
iterations to re-member the fragmented subject and regain an enabling sense of psychic coherence” (Henke 
2000, xix). We may see this insight evidenced more explicitly in memoir that addresses sexual assault, 
but it is not only such “literary” texts that can make use of nontraditional narrative strategies in response 
to sexual violence. Yet, although most of us will encounter multiple stories of sexual violence in various 
contexts, the public at large does not always have access to knowledge about the ways in which trauma may 
alter conventional storytelling habits. 
From student responses to peer-authored work to public comments on newspaper articles, reactions 
to accounts of rape vary as dramatically as the accounts themselves. Reader-response theory can offer us 
a valuable framework to begin to understand some of these divergent reactions: “By bringing their unique 
backgrounds and values to the words on the page, readers actualize the text into a meaningful work that 
in turn stimulates response. Meaning, therefore, should be attributed not to the text or reader but to 
the dynamic transaction between the two” (Schweickart and Flynn 2004, 4). All readings are products 
of the interactions between personal experience and larger cultural scripts. These readings may reinforce 
prevailing paradigms, or disrupt them. As individual readings of particular narratives and general cultural 
narratives feed into each other, each may be altered in response to such an exchange. My interest here is 
in how a multiplicity of ethical individual readings may have the potential to ultimately intervene in the 
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mainstream response to rape, in which doubt and repression are the predominant mechanisms for dealing 
with such an “unspeakable” event.
By approaching trauma-informed text from a standpoint of openness and reciprocity, and engaging with 
it on its own terms, we privilege practices that veer away from judicially based reading models: “Personal 
narratives and witnessing spur critical awareness of cultural difference and initiate possibilities for 
intersubjective exchange beyond the certainties of a secure sense of selfhood” (Schaffer and Smith 2004, 
233). And because “the meaning of a text is not the product of isolated readers but the collaborative product 
of a community of readers” (Schweickart and Flynn 2004, 6), it thus becomes possible to collectively rewrite 
mainstream narratives of rape by encouraging reading practices—in our texts, in our classrooms, and in our 
courtrooms—that privilege ethical interaction with the experiences of another, no matter their form. Taslitz 
maintains that “the muting and distortion of women’s and minorities’ stories at trials work to support group 
subordination. The framing of narrative, therefore, carries profoundly political implications” (1999, 148). 
He thus puts an onus on the legal system “to unsettle cultural narratives” by educating jurors about the 
(often counterintuitive) sociology of rape: “The goal would be to open jurors’ minds to plausible alternative 
tales to the dominant ones” (132). The presentation of counternarratives that take into account the nature 
of trauma and the demographics of rape can lead audiences (here, the audience of the jury, whose response 
to rape narratives has immediate and immensely important consequences) to rethink their point of entry 
into stories of rape: “When a jury judges an act ‘consensual,’ it … creates an interpretive truth based on its 
notions of worthy, coherent narratives and its moral judgment about the gendered meaning to be ascribed 
to the man’s and woman’s social behavior” (Taslitz 1999, 141). Providing juries with alternate lenses to 
approach testimony that cannot be accurately read through the lenses they have already acquired may, 
Taslitz suggests, encourage more comprehensive and ethical readings. 
 As Sebold and Brison attest, however, while successful prosecution of rape is important, it is not enough 
to halt the traumatic aftermath experienced by victims of sexual assault. Many victims turn to either therapy 
or therapeutic writing in the wake of rape. While the act of piecing together a story may be necessary, Herman 
stresses that “by itself, reconstructing the trauma does not address the social or relational dimension of the 
traumatic experience” (1997, 183). For those who choose to tell their stories of violation even in the face of 
overwhelming hostility and doubt, the presence of an audience committed to engaging with such utterances 
from a nondefensive position can be transformative for both speaker and witness. 
Considering the fact that “life narratives have become salable properties in today’s markets” (Schaffer 
and Smith 2004, 23), and that stories of sexual violence continue to proliferate, it seems more important 
than ever that there is an audience that is attuned to the particular demands of trauma-based text:
Personal narratives expand audiences of people around the globe educated about human rights abuses. As 
they reach larger and larger audiences, they can affect readers and prompt acts of engagement with persons 
having experienced rights abuses. Within the context of life narrating, claims take on a human dimension, 
calling for the listener/reader to become more self-reflexive, more informed, more active.… While such 
narrative acts and readings are not a sufficient ground for social change, they are a necessary ground. 
(Schaffer and Smith 2004, 226)
The transformation of rape culture is indeed deeply connected to narrative and reading practices. As 
Schaffer and Smith hint, “translating” the embodied experience of sexual assault into language does not, 
in and of itself, solve the complex and lasting results of such violence for an individual or a culture, but I 
want to end here by insisting that the continued construction—and the ethical reception—of rape narratives 
is of overwhelming import. These acts can not only help victims of violence regain control of their own 
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experience, but are valuable in expanding narrowly conceived social constructions of what rape victims “are 
like.” The relentless cultural transmission of all stories of sexual assault—partial, fragmented, “imperfect” 
as they may be—is one way to confront the reality of rape and shape our knowledge of its reality. Each story 
of rape varies in its particulars; there is no one narrative that can contain these explosive and singular 
moments of disruption. Yet, placed beside each other, these experiences come to mean in a culture in which 
rape has always been a shaping factor, and function as a reminder of the complex power associated with not 
only the telling, but the hearing, of such stories.
Notes
1. And this when the rape is a violent one at the hands of a stranger—as Brownmiller reminds us, “date rapes look 
especially bad for the victim in court, if they ever get to court, nor do they look good on paper” (1975, 257).
2. I focus on female rape victims here because, as philosopher Ann Cahill points out, “men’s and women’s bodies are 
accorded radically different social significance, subject to radically different discourses, and presented with radically 
different demands.… Class, race, sexual orientation: these axes also distinguish bodies and produce different bodily 
experiences; therefore, those axes produce differences in the experience of rape and the threat of rape. By understanding 
the role of the body in sexual and social politics, we will gain a clearer understanding of rape as a bodily assault that is 
a disproportionate threat to women” (2001, 48–49).
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